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INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS AND FERTILITY
Juan Carlos Córdoba and Marla Ripoll
Abstract
Evidence from cross-sectional data reveals a negative relationship between family income and
fertility. This paper argues that constraints to intergenerational transfers are crucial for under-
standing this relationship. If parents could legally impose debt obligations on their children to
recover the costs incurred in raising them, then fertility would be independent of parental in-
come. A relationship between fertility and income arises when parents are unable to leave debts
because of legal, enforcement, or moral constraints. This relationship is negative when the in-
tergenerational elasticity of substitution is larger than one, case in which parental consumption
is a good substitute for childrens consumption.
There is extensive empirical evidence documenting a negative relationship between fertility and
income.1 For example, using cross-sectional individual data for the US, Becker (1960) nds a
negative fertility-income relationship in the 1910, 1940 and 1950 Censuses, and in the Indianapolis
survey for the 1900s. More recently, Jones and Tertilt (2008) use US Census data as far back as the
1826 cohort to estimate an income elasticity of fertility of about  0:38. Their analysis is distinct
in that they construct a more rened measure of lifetime income by using occupational income and
education. Lifetime income and fertility are measured for several cross-sections of ve-year birth
cohorts from 1826-1830 to 1956-1960. They conclude that most of the observed fertility decline
in the US can be explained by the negative fertility-income relationship estimated for each cross-
section, together with the outward shift of the income distribution over time. The estimated income
elasticity is robust to the inclusion of additional controls such as child mortality and the education
Corresponding author: Marla Ripoll, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 4532 W.W. Posvar
Hall, Pittsburgh PA 15260, United States, Email: ripoll@pitt.edu.
An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title: "Barro-Becker with Credit Frictions." We are grateful for the
comments we received from the editor, two anonymous referees, Daniele Coen-Pirani, Xiying Liu and participants
at seminars at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Penn State University, as well as the following
conferences: the "Progressive Economic Research Conference" at the Richmond Fed, the 2010 and 2011 Midwest
Macroeconomics Conferences, the 2011 North American Meeting of the Econometric Society, the Economic Growth
Workshop at the 2011 NBER Summer Institute, and the 2011 "Toward Sustainable Economic Growth" Workshop
sponsored by IAE, CREI and Barcelona GSE.
1See Jones and Tertilt (2008) and Jones et al. (2011) for a recent survey of the literature.
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of husband and wife, suggesting a strong negative correlation between income and fertility. What
explains the observed negative fertility-income relationship?
This paper shows that constraints to intergenerational transfers are central to understanding the
negative fertility-income relationship. We show that if parents could legally impose debt obligations
on their children as a way to recover the costs incurred in raising them, then fertility would be
independent of parental income. In particular, if the present value of a childs future income exceeds
the cost of raising the child, parents would have incentives to raise as many children as possible
in order to maximise rents. Altruistic parents would have extra incentives because, on top of
the nancial benet, they would also enjoy their children. Absent constraints to intergenerational
transfers, fertility would not be associated to parental income. In contrast, if parents cannot impose
debt obligations on their children either because of legal, moral or enforcement reasons, then the
relationship between fertility and parental income can be rationalized. Specically, we show that
debt limits, or bequest constraints, bind precisely when children are a net nancial gain to society,
i.e., the cost of raising the child is below the present value of the childs future income.
Available data discussed in Section 2 indicates that in e¤ect, children are a net nancial gain
in the sense of Becker and Barro (1988). Consider for instance a child from a low income family.
According to the USDA (2012), the typical cost of raising a child born in 2011 from age 0 to 17 for a
family of two adults and two children in the low income group is $169,080. Using a discount rate of
1.5% this corresponds to a present value of $148,962. This gure includes direct parental expenses
made on children through age 17 such as housing, food, transportation, health care, clothing, child
care, and private expenses in education, but abstracts from time costs. Accounting for the time
costs of raising children is not trivial, but the best available estimates suggest a range of between
$223,443 and $446,886 for a low income child. Therefore, the total cost of a low income child stands
at around $372,405 to $595,848 in present value. To obtain an estimate of the present value of this
childs income, the life-cycle prole tted in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) can be used under
the assumptions that the child works from age 18 to 65, and that the parent and the child have the
same income at age 28 (allowing for a real income growth of 1% per year). As discussed in Section
2, this procedure yields a present value of the childs future income of $661,529. These calculations
suggest that a low income child generates more lifetime income than what it costs to raise him.
Net nancial gains for children in middle and high income families are even higher, as we discuss
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in Section 2. Although these children cost more, they also generate more income on average.
The nature of the constraints to intergenerational transfers is to a large extent legal. Schoonbroodt
and Tertilt (2010) provide a summary of how the legal control parents have over their childrens
lifetime labour income has changed over time in the US and England. While prior to 1850 par-
ents in these countries had legal access to their o¤springs labour income, starting in the mid-19th
century many reforms were passed that removed the legal ability of parents to own the earnings of
their children. For instance, starting in the early 19th century, parents in the US lost their right
to legally use their children as servants in exchange for the expenses incurred in raising them. It
became a legal obligation to parents to provide appropriate care of their children. In addition, by
1938 child labour had been banned, and compulsory schooling had been enforced all over the US. In
sum, at least since the early 19th century, parents cannot legally impose debt obligations on their
children to recover the costs of raising them.2 From the perspective of modeling fertility choices,
this historical evolution suggests that the negative fertility-income relationship documented above
for the US plausibly requires the explicit consideration of limits to intergenerational transfers.
In addition to showing how constraints to intergenerational transfers are essential in under-
standing the relationship between fertility and income, our paper contributes to the literature on
fertility choice by providing conditions under which this relationship is negative in models of dynas-
tic altruism. Since both the marginal cost and the marginal benet of children depend on wages,
a negative fertility-wage relation can only be obtained when marginal costs increase proportionally
more than marginal benets. We show that there are at least two channels by which this may
occur. The rst one is when the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption increases with
consumption. Intuitively, an increasing elasticity makes parental consumption a superior good re-
ducing the option value of having a child. For the case of CRRA utility, an increasing elasticity is
only possible if the elasticity of intergenerational substitution, the one controlling the willingness to
substitute consumption between parents and their children, is larger than one. The reason is that
a parent who can easily substitute own and childrens consumption has a lower marginal gain of
adding a child. In other words, adding one more child requires spreading consumption among more
family members, which is more costly for a parent who cares little about consumption smoothing
across generations.
2See Section 2 in Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2010).
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A second instance arises when there exists an exogenous income component, for example, gov-
ernment transfers. This exogenous component increases consumption and therefore the incentives
to have children, but it a¤ects low-wage individuals more than high-wage individuals generating a
negative fertility-income relationship. Since only one of the two channels just discussed is neces-
sary, it is feasible to obtain plausible conditions under which the relationship between fertility and
income is negative.
Beyond o¤ering an explanation for the negative fertility-income relationship in cross-sectional
data within countries, our model also helps explaining cross-country and time-series data. The
poorest countries in the world still exhibit very high levels of fertility, levels that are similar to those
experienced by todays developed nations at the start of their demographic transitions. Dynastic
altruistic models can account for this evidence in the presence of constraints to intergenerational
transfers, an intergenerational elasticity of substitution larger than one, and either an exogenous
income component (non-labour income) or non-homothetic preferences. Our analysis also suggests
that the absence of a legal environment that e¤ectively prevents parents from extracting rents from
their children may be one of the reasons why fertility levels are so high in a number of countries.3
Rent extraction may induce maximum fertility regardless of whether parental income is high or
low.
Our paper also contributes to the literature by integrating dynastic and overlapping generation
models. Since constraints to intergenerational transfers are binding in our model, savings and
aggregate capital are mainly determined by life-cycle considerations, but families still manage to
smooth welfare across generations by adjusting fertility. Issues of Ricardian equivalence and the role
of social security in achieving e¢ ciency are usually studied in the context of exogenous fertility. For
instance, Weil (1987) and Abel (1987) show that Ricardian equivalence does not hold when bequest
constraints are binding, and that social security transfers are not fully compensated by bequests.4
This paper complements this literature by deriving conditions under which bequest constraints bind
in an altruistic OLG model with endogenous fertility.5 We also derive conditions under which a
negative fertility-income relationship is obtained both in partial and general equilibrium.
3Doepke (2004) develops a theory of demographic transition based on the related idea that changes to child labor
regulation laws can help explain the demographic transition. Our theory does not rely on changes to child labor
regulation laws.
4We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
5See Lapan and Enders (1990) for a related paper on this point.
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Although the literature on endogenous fertility choices is vast, only a handful of papers have
explicitly modeled how constraints to intergenerational transfers a¤ect fertility choices. Many
models of dynastic altruism do not consider constraints to intergenerational transfers, while others
shut down asset markets without discussing the underlying rationale of this choice.6 A notable
recent exception is Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014), who examine e¢ ciency issues in an altruistic
model of endogenous fertility and constraints to parental ownership of childrens income. Our
paper complements theirs, and it is the rst paper to explicitly rationalize the role of constraints
to intergenerational transfers in accounting for the observed negative fertility-income relationship.
There is also a related literature in which parents are not purely altruistic, but they care
about the number, and sometimes about the quality, of their children.7 Although this strand
of the literature has made important contributions to the understanding of a number of empirical
regularities, most notably the demographic transition, these models implicitly assume zero bequests,
and therefore do not discuss the role of constraints to intergenerational transfers.8 Interestingly,
our paper shows that when bequest constraints bind in dynastic altruistic models a link can be
established between purely altruistic and some non-altruistic models. This link suggests that both
approaches may result in similar predictions when constraints to intergenerational transfers are
properly considered. Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014) arrive to a similar conclusion in their analysis
of e¢ ciency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops a dynastic altruistic
model of endogenous fertility, derives the main results of the paper regarding the fertility-income
relationship, and obtains the conditions under which bequest constraints bind in partial equilibrium.
Data on the cost of raising children and the present value of childrens future income is presented in
Section 2. Section 3 extends the results to general equilibrium. Concluding comments are provided
in Section 4 and technical details are presented in the appendix.
6Dynastic altruistic models in the tradition of Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989), along with
most of the subsequent work surveyed in Jones et al. (2011) abstract from intergenerational transfer constraints. A
few papers, including Becker et al. (1990), Doepke (2004), De la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010), and Jones and
Schoonbroodt (2014), shut down all asset markets. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
7Notable examples in this category of papers include Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001), Greenwood and Seshadri
(2002), Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), Tamura (2006), Galor et al. (2009), and Ashraf and Galor (2011).
8For a more extensive discussion on this see Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014).
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1 A constrained model of dynastic altruism
This section considers fertility decisions by altruistic parents in a partial equilibrium OLG economy,
or alternatively, in a small open economy. General equilibrium considerations are postponed to
Section 3. The main purpose of this section is twofold. First, it derives and interprets the conditions
under which constraints to intergenerational transfers bind, and it shows how in this case fertility
and parental income are related. Second, it derives and discusses the conditions under which the
fertility-income relationship is negative.
1.1 Altruistic preferences
Consider a model in which time is discrete and individuals live for three periods: one as children,
one as working young adults, and one as retirees. A young adult or parent at time t consumes c1t
in period t and c2t+1 in period t+ 1, has nt children at time t, and derives utility
Vt = U(c1t; c2t+1) + (nt)Vt+1 for t = 0; 1; :::; (1)
where U(c1t; c2t+1)  0 is a utility ow, (nt)  0 is the weight parents place on the welfare of their n
children, n 2 [0; N ] ; and Vt+1  0 is the utility of a child. Assume U(c1t; c2t+1) = u(c1t)+u(c2t+1);
where u is a non-negative utility function and  > 0. Further assume (0) = 0; 0(n) > 0; 00(n) < 0
and (N) < 1. The last three restrictions imply that parental altruism is positive, decreasing in the
number of children, and bounded.9 In particular, the average degree of altruism, (n)  (n)=n;
decreases with n.
The (marginal) willingness to pay for a child, WTP , is a key determinant of the demand for
children. It is measured by the marginal rate of substitution between parental consumption and
children as dened by
WTP (nt; c1t; Vt+1)  @c1t
@nt
=
@Vt=@nt
@Vt=@c1t
= 0(nt)
Vt+1
u0(c1t)
: (2)
9As in Becker and Barro (1988), we only consider the positive utility case. Alvarez (1999), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) and Jones and Schoonbroodt (2009, 2010) analyze cases with negative utility by allowing 0(n) < 0. We do not
consider this possibility because it is intrinsically inconsistent with fully altruistic parents. Jones and Schoonbroodt
(2009) show that there is an interpretation of their problem under which "parents are only weakly altruistic toward
their children" (p. 3). Cordoba and Ripoll (2011, example 2) formalize the idea of "altruism" and show that the
extension with 0(n) < 0 violates the fundamental axiom of altruism. Moreover, a framework with positive utility
can handle any elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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The rst component of this expression, 0(nt); is the altruistic weight parents give to the n-th child,
while the second component is the welfare of the child measured in (parental) consumption units.
WTP (n; c; V ) decreases with n and increases with c1 and V . Below, we focus on a steady state
situation in which allocations and welfare are constant over time. In this case equations (1) and
(2) simplify to
V =
(1 + )u (c)
1  (n) ; and (3)
WTP (n; c) = (1 + )
u (c)
u0(c)
0(n)
1  (n) =
1 + 
u(c)
0(n)
1  (n)c; (4)
where u(c) = u0(c)(c=u(c)) > 0 is the elasticity of the utility function with respect to consumption.
When the elasticity is a constant independent of c, the marginal valuation of a child is proportional
to consumption. This means that the steady state expansion path on the consumption-children
space is linear, so that doubling income would double the valuation of a child. This channel
alone works toward producing a positive relationship between fertility and income. However, the
e¤ect is weakened when the elasticity u(c) is an increasing function of consumption. In that case
parental consumption is like a superior good and as a result richer parents are less willing to trade
their own consumption for children. As we formalize below, once budget and intergenerational
transfer constraints are introduced, an increasing elasticity is the rst channel that could explain
the negative fertility income relationship.
Examples of utility functions that exhibit an increasing elasticity are (i) CRRA functions of
the form u(c) = c1 =(1  ) +A with  2 (0; 1) and A > 0; and (ii) Stone-Geary functions of the
form u(c) = (c  a)1  =(1 ) with  2 (0; 1) and a < 0. Both of these cases require relative mild
curvature of the utility function,  2 (0; 1) : Examples of utility functions that exhibit decreasing
elasticity are the CRRA case with  > 1, Stone-Geary with a minimum consumption requirement,
a > 0; and CARA functions, u(c) = 1  e c:We discuss the CRRA case in detail below. The high
curvature case is problematic when rationalizing the negative fertility-income relationship because
it implies strong diminishing marginal utility of parental income, which would cause richer parents
to put a relatively higher value on children and thus demand more children.
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1.2 Constraints: parental budget and intergenerational transfers
Young adults work, raise children and save. Retirees use savings to consume and bequeath to
their children. Bequests are restricted to be non-negative. Raising a child involves three costs: a
time cost of w; a goods cost of ; and bequests bt+1 per child. While  and  are technological
parameters, bt+1 is a choice variable.10 The restriction N  1 is required so that the total time
invested in children does not exceed available parental time. The parental budget constraint is
w + y + bt = c1t +
c2t+1
1 + r
+ nt

w + +
bt+1
1 + r

;
where w is the wage rate, r the interest rate, and y is an exogenous income component or non-labour
income (e.g., government transfers).
In addition to the budget constraint, individuals face constraints to intergenerational transfers
in the form of non-negative bequest constraints: bt+1  0 for all t  0. As discussed in the
introduction, these restrictions may reect legal or other constraints making it unfeasible to enforce
debt contracts on descendants. Some parameter restrictions are needed for bequest constraints
to bind. We postulate the key assumption in this section and show its relevance below when
characterizing optimal choices.
Assumption 1. Binding bequest constraints. (i) limn!0 (1 + r)(n) < 1 for all n and/or
(ii) w + y > (1 + r) (w + ) :
The rst case in which bequest constraints bind, condition (i), is one in which the interest
rate is low and/or parents do not attach enough weight to their children. As in models with
impatient agents, it is optimal in this situation for early members of the dynasty to borrow and
nance a relatively high consumption while later members pay debts and consume less. Similar
conditions are derived in Weil (1987) and Abel (1987) for bequest constraints to bind in an OLG
model with exogenous fertility. Assumption 1 (i) is satised by functions (n) =  (1  e n) or
(n) = (n) =(1 + n) under the restriction (1 + r) < 1:
A second case arises when the cost of raising children is lower than future childrens earnings,
as described in Assumption 1 (ii). This assumption describes the case in which parents could
nancially benet from having children. Absent bequest constraints, parents could borrow to pay
10As in Becker and Barro (1988), the technology of raising a child is Leontief in parental time and goods.
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all costs of raising children and then let their children pay these debts by endowing each child with
negative bequests. Parents could also extract rents by leaving negative bequests that are larger
than the cost of raising the child, but not so large as to eliminate any consumption by the child.
Binding constraints to intergenerational transfers prevent such solutions to arise in equilibrium.
Assumption 1 (ii) is of particularly empirical relevance. Section 2 provides detailed evidence on the
costs of raising children and estimates of childrens future income. As we show there, the evidence
strongly suggests that children are a net nancial benet in the sense that the cost of raising a
child is lower than the present value of the childs earnings.
The following assumption is made for convenience and it is relaxed in Section 3. It generates
a simple at life-cycle consumption prole but none of the main results depend on this particular
assumption.
Assumption 2. Interest rate in partial equilibrium.  (1 + r) = 1:
1.3 Individuals problem and decision rules
It is convenient to formulate the individuals problem as a dynamic programming problem.11 Let
V (b) be the maximum lifetime utility of a parent who inherits b. The young adults problem is to
choose consumptions, c1 and c2; fertility n, and bequest, b0; that solve the problem
V (b) = max
c1;c2;b00; Nn0
U(c1; c2) + (n)V (b
0); (5)
subject to
w + y + b  c1 + c2
1 + r
+ n

w + +
b0
1 + r

: (6)
The rst order condition for optimal savings and bequests can be expressed respectively as
u0(c1) = (1 + r) u0(c2); and (7)
u0(c1)  (1 + r)(n)u0(c01), with equality if b0 > 0. (8)
11See Appendix A.1 for technical details about the proper boundness and transversality conditions of the endogenous
fertility problem.
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The rst equation is the traditional Euler equation describing optimal intra-generational consump-
tion smoothing. Assumption 2 together with equation (7) imply c1 = c2.12 The second condition
is an intergenerational Euler equation describing optimal consumption smoothing across parents
and their children. The inequality reects the possibility of binding bequest constraints. Savings,
on the other hand, are unconstrained. The relevant discount factor controlling optimal bequests
is endogenous and corresponds to the average degree of altruism toward children, (n). When be-
quest constraints are not binding, (8) describes a quantity-growth trade-o¤: consumption growth
is negatively related to fertility. As shown below, when constraints are binding the trade-o¤ is
between fertility and the consumption level rather than consumption growth.
The optimality condition for fertility is given by13
u0(c1)

b0
1 + r
+ w + 

= 0(n)V (b0): (9)
The left hand side of equation (9) is the marginal cost of a child. It includes the cost of raising a
child plus the present value of any bequests, both multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption.
The marginal benet, on the other hand, is the welfare of the child, V; times the parental weight
associated to the last child, 0(n).
As pointed out by Alvarez (1999), fertility decisions are analogous to investment decisions. To
see this, rewrite (9) as
u0(c1) = (1 + rn) 0(n)u0(c01); (10)
where
1 + rn  V (b
0)=u0(c01)
b0= (1 + r) + w + 
;
is the gross return of having a child. This is the case because V=u0 is the value of a life in terms
of goods while b0= (1 + r) + w +  is the marginal cost of creating a life. Comparing (10) and (8)
shows that fertility decisions are analogous to investment decisions. Moreover, returns on children
12 Identical solutions for fertility can be obtained if instead of Assumption 2, u(c) is assumed to be CRRA. In this
case, equation (7) can be written as: c2 = (r; )c1 where (r; ) = u0 1

1
(1+r)

:
13For simplicity, we discuss only cases where optimal fertility is an interior solution. Appendix A.2 describes the
assumptions on the functional forms of u(c) and (n) required for the existence of an interior solution for fertility.
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and bequests must satisfy the arbitrage condition
(1 + rn) 0(n)  (1 + r) (n)=n:
Since (n) is concave, this condition implies that in an interior solution 1 + rn > 1 + r, meaning
that returns to fertility must be larger than returns to nancial assets. This fertility premium
is required because additional savings allow parents to provide each child with larger bequests
increasing parental utility in proportion to the average degree of altruism, (n)=n; but having an
extra child, holding bequests constant, increases the utility of the parent only in proportion to the
marginal degree of altruism, 0(n).
1.4 Constrained allocation: steady state
We now characterize the steady state of the model and focus on cases in which Assumption 1 holds.
We rst show that bequest constraints are binding under Assumption 1 (i). In steady state the
optimality condition for bequests in equation (8) simplies to
1  (1 + r)(n), with equality if b0 > 0. (11)
Since (n) decreases with n, Assumption 1 (i) implies (1 + r)(n) < 1 for all n and therefore b = 0
is the only possible solution to (11).
Let n and c = c1 = c2 be the steady state solutions when bequest constraints bind. In this
case (5) simplies to (3) while (6) and (9) simplify to
c =
w + y   n (w + )
1 + 
; and (12)
w +  = (1 + )
0(n)
1  (n)
u (c)
u0(c)
=WTP (c; n): (13)
The last expression equates the marginal rate of transformation to the marginal rate of substitution
between parental consumption and children. The left hand side of (13) is the marginal cost of raising
a child while the right hand side is the marginal benet, what was dened above as the willingness
to pay for a child. According to (13) and (12), optimal fertility, n, generally depends on w and
y in the constrained case. As we show below, this stands in sharp contrast with the determinants
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of fertility in the unconstrained allocation, where fertility is not determined from such comparison
of costs and benets of children. It is interesting to notice the similarity between equation (13)
and the determinants of fertility in some non-altruistic models. For instance, in Greenwood and
Seshadri (2002, p. 156) fertility is determined by equalizing marginal costs and marginal benets
of children. Marginal costs include the opportunity wage cost of children, and the benets are a
function of the future wage of the child.
Equations (12) and (13) can be used to obtain a graphical solution of c and n. Equation (12)
provides a negative relationship between consumption and fertility, while (13) provides a positive
relationship. This last relationship follows because u(c)=u0(c) is an increasing function of c.14
The following proposition characterizes the e¤ects of non-labour income and wages on consump-
tion and fertility.
Proposition 1. Comparative statics. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then @c=@y > 0;
@n=@y > 0 and @c=@w > 0 while @n=@w is undetermined.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
According to Proposition 1, both consumption and fertility increase with non-labour income,
y. Furthermore, while the e¤ect of wages on fertility is undetermined, higher wages increase con-
sumption. The model thus provides plausible comparative statistics for consumption.
1.5 The negative fertility-income relationship
According to equations (12) and (13), wages a¤ect optimal fertility decisions in three ways. First,
higher wages increase the time cost of raising children which alone would lead to a lower fertility by
high wage parents. Second, higher wages also increase consumption and welfare of children, and in
fact of all descendants via the term u(c), an e¤ect that tends to generate a positive fertility-wage
relationship. Finally, higher wages and higher parental consumption reduce the marginal utility of
consumption, u0(c); making the utility gains from having children more valuable. As explained in
Section 1.1, the stronger the diminishing marginal utility of income the higher the willingness to
pay for a child. Whether @n=@w is positive or negative depends on which e¤ect dominates. One
14Assumption A.1 in Appendix A.2 guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a single crossing.
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can rewrite equation (13) as follows so that only two e¤ects need to be considered
w + 
w + y   n (w + ) =
1
u(c)
0(n)
1  (n) : (14)
The left hand side of equation (14) is the marginal cost of a child relative to consumption while
the right hand side is the marginal benet also relative to consumption. Given that the relative
marginal benet is decreasing in n (Assumption A.1), fertility decreases with wages when the
relative marginal cost increases with wages or the relative marginal benet decreases with wages.
Equation (14) allows to identify two fundamental reasons why fertility may decrease with wages.
The rst one is when the relative marginal cost increases with wages. A simple derivative shows that
this occurs when y > =: Thus, a positive and su¢ ciently large amount of non-labour income y; or
a su¢ ciently low goods-intensity of raising a children =, lead to a higher relative cost of raising
children and a lower demand for children. To understand why, consider for a moment the case y = 0
and = > 0. In that case the relative marginal cost strictly decreases with wages because higher
wages proportionally increase income w, while it increases costs w +  less than proportionally.
On the other hand, if y > 0 but  = 0 then higher wages increase costs w proportionally, while
income w + y increases less than proportionally. In the borderline case  = y > 0; the relative
marginal cost becomes independent of wages.
The second reason is when the relative marginal benet decreases with wages. This occurs when
the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption, u(c), is an increasing function of consumption
since, as stated in Proposition 1, consumption is an increasing function of wages. As discussed in
Section 1.1, in that case parental consumption is like a superior good and as a result richer parents
are increasingly less willing to trade their own consumption for a child. The following proposition
summarizes these results.
Proposition 2. Fertility-income relationship. Fertility falls with wages if either of the
following inequalities hold, and at least one of them is strict:
(i) non-labour income and cost of raising children are such that y > =;
(ii) preferences are such that @u(c)=@c  0;
Proof. Follows directly from equation (14): condition (i) guarantees that the left-hand-side is
increasing in w, while condition (ii) implies that the right-hand-side is decreasing with w.
We now discuss the second channel in Proposition 2 in more detail. In order to more broadly
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explore the implications of this preferences channel, consider CRRA utility u(c) = c1 =(1 )+A;
where 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. When  > 1 constant A > 0 is needed for
utilities to remain positive.15 For this utility function u(c) = (1   )=[1 + (1  )Ac 1]: Notice
that when  > 1, u(c) decreases with consumption and furthermore limc!1 u(c) = 0. This reveals
a key feature of fertility choices with CRRA utilities: individuals choose maximum fertility when
the elasticity of substitution is below one and wages are su¢ ciently high. In terms of equation
(13), the marginal value of income, u0(c) = c ; falls at a faster rate than the rate at which the
opportunity cost of raising children increases as w !1. As a result, the relative marginal cost of
raising children decreases toward zero while the relative marginal benet remains bounded above
zero making maximum fertility optimal. In contrast, when the elasticity of substitution is above
one, fertility can be an interior solution. In this case,  2 (0; 1) ; u(0) = 0 and limc!1 u(c) = 1 :
Thus, the relative marginal cost of children for poor individuals is zero and therefore they choose
the maximum number of children. These results are formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. CRRA utility and fertility when w ! 1 and w ! 0. Let u(c) =
c1 
1  + A  0 where   0 and  6= 1: Then, limw!1 n(w) = N if  > 1 and limw!1 n(w) =
min[en; N ] if  < 1 where en solves the equation

1  en = 11   0(en)1  (en) : (15)
Furthermore, limw!0 n(w) = N if  2 (0; 1):
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The result with  > 1 resembles one obtained by Hall and Jones (2007) for the case of longevity.
They show that longevity is a superior good when  > 1 because the marginal utility of consumption
falls with income, which implies that the marginal cost of longevity also falls, while the marginal
benet of longevity does not. Although such feature of preferences is convenient to explain the
increasing demand for longevity, it renders the case  > 1 inconsistent with the negative fertility-
income relationship.
When  2 (0; 1), fertility approaches a value determined by (15). For the case (n) =
 (1  e n) ; equation (15) becomes (1  )  (1  ) een +  =  (1  en) ; which has a unique
15Furthermore, consumption has to be above [(   1)A] 11  to guarantee u(c)  0. When  > 1, A corresponds
to the maximum utility ow while the minimum utility ow is zero.
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solution if (1  )  < : Thus, fertility for high wage individuals (w ! 1) depends negatively
on the time cost of raising children, , and positively on the degree of altruism, :
Proposition 3 creates a tension between the theory and the empirics: while an intertemporal
elasticity (1=) lower than one is typically used in applied work, this elasticity would have the
counterfactual implication that the most productive individuals would have the highest fertility.16
Intuitively, a low elasticity of substitution increases the option value of providing positive con-
sumption to a newborn as wages increase. In contrast, if the elasticity is larger than one, then
high parental consumption can substitute for low or zero consumption of descendants. But a closer
look at this intuition reveals that the key parameter is not the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, which controls intra-personal consumption smoothing, but the intergenerational elasticity of
substitution which controls inter-personal consumption smoothing. When preferences are additive
separable, as we assume, both elasticities are equal to 1=: In a companion paper, Cordoba and
Ripoll (2011), we show that if these two elasticities are disentangled using non-separable models,
then the tension described above is resolved: the most productive individuals do not need to have
the highest fertility even if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one as long as the
intergenerational elasticity is above one. The practical implication of these results is that for fertil-
ity issues it is better to interpret 1= in separable models as the intergenerational rather than the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
While Proposition 3 refers only to high or low wage individuals, the following Lemma provides
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for fertility to decrease with wages for all wage levels for the
case of CRRA preferences.
Lemma 1. CRRA utility and fertility. Let u(c) = c
1 
1  + A  0 where   0: Then
@n=@w < 0 if and only if
1 +
y
w
> [	(c) (1  n) + n]

1 +

w

; (16)
where
	(c) =  + u(c) =  +
1  
1 + (1  )Ac 1 :
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
16See discussion in Jones et al. (2011).
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The following proposition uses Lemma 1 to typify two polar cases in which fertility decreases
with wages. While  2 (0; 1) is needed in both cases, the rst case also requires strictly positive
non-labour income while the second requires non-homothetic preferences.
Proposition 4. Non-labour income and non-homothetic utility. Let u(c) = c
1 
1  +
A  0 where   0. Then if 0 <  < 1 fertility decreases with wages in the following cases:
(i) non-labour income case: A = 0 and y > =;
(ii) non-homothetic preferences:  = y = 0 and A > 0:
Proof. Follows from condition (16) in Lemma 4. Notice that in case (ii) 	(c) < 	(1) = 1:
The rst part of Proposition 4 requires a su¢ ciently large non-labour income component. If
y > 0 and labour is the only input in the production of children, then the condition is satised
for all wages, and @n=@w ! 0 as w ! 1: The second part of Proposition 4 assumes y = 0 but
sets A > 0. This non-homotheticity of the utility function generates a decreasing relative marginal
benet of children as w increases.
Proposition 4 highlights the importance of either non-labour income or non-homothetic utility in
order to generate a negative fertility-income relationship under the constrained allocation. Although
this is indeed the case here, we have veried in ongoing work that the presence of non-labour income
or non-homothetic utility are not required in generalizations of the constrained model to settings
with uncertainty.17 In those settings, what is essential to obtain the negative fertility-income
relationship is the non-negative bequest constraint.
In conclusion, once bequest constraints bind, there are instances in which a negative fertility-
income relationship holds, as described in Propositions 2 and 4. The conditions described in
these propositions are not strong, as only one of them should hold with strict inequality for the
results to go through. Are these conditions novel? Are they plausible? Some of these conditions,
specically the presence of non-labour income and non-homothetic utility, have been discussed in
the fertility literature, but in the context of static models of fertility choice.18 One of the novelties
of Propositions 2 and 4 is that they are derived in the context of a dynamic model of fertility
in which the constraints to intergenerational transfers are explicitly considered. As we show next
subsection, in the absence of these constraints, fertility is independent of income.
The requirement that the intergenerational elasticity of substitution is larger than one, i.e.,
17See Cordoba et al. (2014) and Cordoba and Liu (2014).
18See Jones et al. (2011).
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the case  < 1 discussed above, is novel. This condition makes intuitive sense if we associate
intergenerational substitution as the relevant long-run concept, while the more known intertemporal
substitution is thought of as relevant for the short run. There is evidence in the macroeconomics
literature that individuals have low willingness to substitute consumption across periods, so the
smoothing motive is strong in the short run. The fertility evidence on the other hand suggests
high willingness to substitute consumption across generations. The notion of intergenerational
substitution as the relevant long-run concept is also novel.
1.6 Unconstrained intergenerational transfers
In contrast with the constrained case discussed so far, many of the altruistic models of fertility in
the tradition of Becker and Barro (1988) assume unconstrained bequests. We now characterize the
unconstrained solution and compare it with the constrained solution. The most important message
of this subsection is that in the absence of constraints to intergenerational transfers, fertility is
independent of income. This is the case both for the steady state and for the transition of the
model.
Let n and c = c1 = c2 be the steady state solutions of the unconstrained problem. In this case
the intergenerational Euler equation (8) holds with equality, and in steady state it reads
1 = (1 + r)(n): (17)
According to this expression, steady state fertility is a sole and positive function of the interest
rate but it is independent of level variables such as w or y: The unconstrained model thus does not
generate the sort of negative fertility-income relationship observed in the data. The fundamental
reason for this prediction is that steady state fertility is fully determined by the intergenerational
Euler equation, an equation in which level variables do not play a role, rather than by the rst
order condition for fertility, a condition that in contrast includes level variables. While equation
(8) would determine the balanced growth rate of individual consumption in a standard model with
exogenous fertility, in models with endogenous fertility it determines the discount factor, which is
endogenous and a function of steady state fertility.19
19The lack of a relationship between fertility and income implied by equation (17) does not mean that children are
not normal goods. It reects instead that all fertility adjustments to income changes take place during the transition.
In the Barro-Becker model, for example, the e¤ects of all present and future income changes on fertility take place
17
Once fertility is determined by the interest rate, steady state consumption is determined by
c =
1
1 + 
u(c)
(n)  u(c) [(1 + r) (w + )  w   y] ;
where (n) = 0(n)(n=(n)) > 0 is the elasticity of the altruistic function with respect to the
number of children. According to this expression, consumption is positive only if children are a
net nancial burden to parents and to society: (1 + r) (w + ) needs to be larger than w + y.
This prediction is at odds with the data presented in the introduction and expanded in Section 2,
which suggests children are not a net nancial burden. Notice that if Assumption 1 (ii) holds, then
the unconstrained solution is not possible because consumption would be negative. Assumption 1
(ii) thus provides a su¢ cient, but not necessary condition, for bequest constraints to bind. The
condition is su¢ cient because it holds for all n. A necessary and su¢ cient condition can be derived
as follows. Given fertility and consumption, optimal bequests are determined from the budget
constraint as
b =
(1 + ) c  (w + y) + n (w + )
(1 + r   n) =(1 + r) :
Equation (17) implies that 1+ r n = (1 + r) (1  (n)) > 0. Therefore, steady state bequests are
non-negative if (1 + ) c+n (w + ) > w+ y: The following is a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for b < 0.
Proposition 5. Binding bequest constraint. Let n solve 1 = (1 + r)(n): Then a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for bequest constraints to bind is
u(c)
(n)
n (w + )
w + y   n (w + ) <
n
1 + r   n;
where (n) is the elasticity of function  with respect to n.
Proof. This proposition follows after algebraically transforming condition (1 + ) c+n (w + )
< w + y, which as shown above induces negative bequests in the unconstrained case.
In order to interpret Proposition 5, assume that =w  0 which describes a rich individual in
which w is high relative to , and suppose y = 0. In this case, the condition in Proposition 5
only in the rst period since their economy reaches a steady state in the second period. Without bequest constraints,
the present value of all incomes is accrued by the rst generation, and for isoelastic preferences, it is optimal for only
the rst generation to increase its fertility. Intuitively, more income means more branches out of the trunk of the tree,
but consumption and fertility remain the same on each branch. For non-isoelastic cases the situation is di¤erent, but
it becomes the same as the isoelastic case in the steady state.
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becomes
u

n
1  n <
n
1 + r   n =
(n)
1  (n) ;
where the last equality uses equation (17). Since u= < 1; this condition states that the weight
that parents give to their children, (n); needs to be larger than the total fraction of time spent
raising children, n: According to this condition, bequest constraints bind if u=, the interest
rate, and the cost of raising children are su¢ ciently low, or if wages are su¢ ciently high.20 In sum,
the unconstrained model, or the Becker and Barro (1988) model, predicts fertility is independent
of income and that children are a nancial burden to the parents.
These predictions hold not only for the steady state, but also along the transition. To see this,
consider equation (8) which still holds with equality in the unconstrained model. Assuming CRRA
utility, equation (8) becomes
(nt) =

ct+1
ct

(1 + rt+1)
 1 ;
where 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This equation states that fertility is a
positive function of the interest rate and a negative function of the growth rate of consumption. In
other words, conditional on economic growth and interest rates, fertility is independent of the level
of income. The evidence reported in the introduction suggests otherwise. For instance, Jones and
Tertilt (2008) estimate an income elasticity of fertility of about  0:38. Similar relationship between
fertility and family income is reported by Lam (1986) for Brazil, and Kaur (2000) for India. The
model with unconstrained intergenerational transfers cannot account for this evidence.21
2 Children as a net nancial benet
Assumption 1 (ii) provides a direct way to empirically explore a condition under which bequest
constraints bind, namely that the cost of raising children is lower than the value of childrens future
earnings. When this is the case children represent a net nancial benet, a term coined in Becker
and Barro (1988). Although the question of whether children are a net nancial benet is hard to
20A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is (1 + r)  < 1: In thit case, using (17) it follows that
(n)
1  (n) =
1
1=(n)  1 =
1
(1 + r) =n  1 >
1
1= (n)  1 >
Uc
n
n
1  n :
21The argument is analogous to why frictionless models cannot explain the documented relationship between
individual schooling and individual income. See Cordoba and Ripoll (2013) for details.
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answer, available evidence suggests this is the case, as we now discuss. According to the USDA
(2012), the typical cost of raising a child born in 2011 from age 0 to 17 for a family of four in the
lowest income group is $169,080, while for a family in the middle-income group is $234,900 and for
a high-income family is $389,670 in 2011 dollars. These are projected costs that assume an ination
rate of 2.55%. Assuming a discount rate of 1.5%, the corresponding present values of these sums
are $148,962 for low income, $206,709 for middle income, and $342,759 for the high income group.
As discussed in the introduction these totals include direct parental expenses made on children
through age 17 such as housing, food, transportation, health care, clothing, child care, and private
expenses in education. These gures correspond to the goods costs of raising children.
Accounting for the time costs of raising children is not trivial. Available estimates are based on
time use survey data, but the di¢ culty of measuring time costs is that in many instances parents
multitask, taking care of children as a secondary activity while performing other primary activities.
Using the 2003-2006 American Time Use Survey, Guryan et al. (2008) nd that while mothers
spend around 14 hours per week in child care, fathers spend around 7 hours. These measures only
include the time parents spend primarily on basic care of children, education, recreation and any
travel related to these. They refer to overall averages for families with at least one child under the
age of 18.22 However, if the total time parents spend in the presence of their children is measured
(both primary and secondary time), then mothers spend 45 hours per week and fathers spend 30
hours. The extent to which both primary and secondary time should be included in the cost of
raising children is a matter of debate in the literature.
In a related study, Folbre (2008) uses the 1997 Child Development Supplement of the Panel Sur-
vey of Income Dynamics to conclude that the average amount of both passive and active parental-
care hours per child (not including sleep) is 41.3 per week for a two-parent household with two
children ages 0 to 11. Passive care corresponds to the time the child is awake but not engaged in
activity with an adult, while active parental care measures the time the child is engaged in activity
with at least a parent. In addition to reporting hours spent in child care, Folbre (2008) discusses
two alternative ways of computing the monetary value of these hours: one uses a child-care workers
wage and the other the median wage. When the former method is used is combination with the
USDA (2012) goods cost of raising children, the time cost of raising children is on average around
22These estimates go up to 21 hours per week for mothers and around 10 hours for fathers in families with at least
one child under the age of 5.
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60% of the total costs (see Table 7.3, p. 135), a lower-end estimated. Since the median wage is
around the double of a child-care workers wage, then using the former time valuation the time
cost of raising children increases to 75% of the total costs. This evidence suggests the time costs of
raising children are high: they are between 1.5 and 3 times the goods costs or direct expenditures
in children.
Combining the information above we compute bounds on the time cost of raising children for
each of the USDA (2012) income categories. The results are presented in Table 1. Scenario 1
corresponds to the case in which time costs are 60% of the total costs (goods plus time) of raising
children. This scenario holds either when the 21 hours per week of primary care in Guryan et al.
(2008) are valued at the median wage, or when the 41.3 hours per week in Folbre (2008) are valued
at a child-care workers wage. Scenario 2 corresponds to the case in which time costs are 75% of the
total costs of raising children. This scenario corresponds to the 41 hours per week of passive and
active parental child care valued at the median wage as in Folbre (2008). As can be seen in Table
1, the time costs of raising children are between $223,443 and $446,886 for low-income families;
between $310,063 and $620,127 for middle-income families; and between $514,138 and $1,028,227
for high-income families. All these gures correspond to present values at birth of the child in 2011
using a discount rate of 1.5%. Table 1 also presents the following bounds for the total costs of raising
children: for a low-income family between $372,405 and $595,848; for a middle-income family the
bounds are $516,772 and $826,836; and for a high-income family $856,897 and $1,371,036. Children
in the United States are expensive to raise.
What is the value of childrens future earnings? Table 2 presents estimates of the present value of
childrens future earnings for low, middle and high-income families. For this purpose, we rst create
a "representative" family for each income group. Using the family income brackets from USDA
(2012), we select a 2011 income of $36,665 for the representative low-income family; $81,140 for
middle income, and $126,435 for a high-income family. The low-income family number is computed
as the average of the 2011 earnings of a worker making the federal minimum wage, which is about
$13,920, and the upper bound of low-income families from the USDA (2012), which is $59,410.
The middle-income family number is simply the mid-point of the USDA (2012) interval of $59,410
to $102,280. Last, the high-income "representative" family is computed as the average between
$102,280 and $150,000, which represents the 90th percentile of the family income distribution in
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2011 according to the US Census Bureau.
Next, we compute the future earnings of a child from each income group as follows. Abstracting
momentarily from college attendance, we assume children work from age 18 to 65. We also assume
that the parent and the child have the same income at age 28, but taking into account that real
income grows at a rate of 1% per year.23 We use age 28 as a benchmark because it corresponds
to the mean childbearing age in the US according to the OECD. To compute the whole earning
prole from ages 18 to 65 we introduce life-cycle considerations. For this purpose we use the
income polynomial estimated for the US in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), in which log wages
are expressed as a third-degree polynomial in age.24 Using this procedure we obtain reasonable
life-cycle income proles with income peaking around age 41. Assuming a rate of discount of 1.5%,
the present value of the childs future income is $661,529 for the child from the low-income family,
$1,463,970 for the child from the middle-income family, and $2,281,206 for the high-income family
child. As shown in Table 2, these gures support the notion that children are a net nancial benet
for parents in all income groups, since the childs income is above the total cost of raising him under
either of the two scenarios of Table 1.
Two remarks on our computations are in order. First, the USDA (2012) direct expenditures
on children include only ages 0 to 17, so college expenses are not included. Including college
costs should not revert the net nancial benet on Table 2 to a net nancial cost because it
would most likely be children in middle and high-income families the ones attending college and
the computed net benets are sizeable. Second, our model predicts that when bequest constraints
bind, no bequests or other inter-vivos transfers to adult children are given. Although (non-schooling
related) inter-vivos transfers and voluntary bequests do occur in the United States, a relatively small
fraction of adults receive them, and for the majority of them the amounts are small. For instance,
using the 1988 special supplement on transfers between relatives from the PSID, Altonji et al.
(1997) document than only 23% of adult children (on average 31 years old) receive transfers from
parents (on average 59 years old). These are overall small transfers: the mean is $1,810 in 1988
dollars, or $3,442 in 2011 dollars; and the median is $500 in 1988 dollars, or $951 in 2011 dollars. A
similar pattern has been documented for bequests. Using the 1993-1995 Asset and Health Dynamics
23To compare the income of the child and the parent at age 28, we divide family income by two since the families
in the USDA (2012) sample we use are two-parent families.
24See their Table 5. According to the estimation, the coe¢ cient on age is 0:0979, on age squared is  0:0029, and
that on age cubed is 0:00001.
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among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data, Hurd and Smith (2001) document that most bequests are of
little of no value: single descendants at the bottom 30% receive $2,000 (or $2,952 in 2011 dollars),
and the average single descendant receives $10,000 ($14,760 in 2011 dollars). Given the highly
skewed wealth distribution in the United States, the occurrence of signicant bequests concerns
only of a small fraction of the population. The evidence on inter-vivos transfers and bequests does
not overturn the facts document above regarding how for almost all parents in the United States,
children are a net nancial benet.
3 General equilibrium
Consider now the join determination of fertility, consumption, savings, wages and interest rates in
a closed economy. In this section we show that the main results of Section 1 hold in general equi-
librium. First, we show that in general equilibrium the negative fertility-wage relationship reects
a negative relationship between fertility and total factor productivity (TFP). Second, we discuss
conditions for bequest constraints to bind in general equilibrium. We now explicitly introduce time
subscripts, drop Assumption 2 and consider a specic functional form for u and a Cobb-Douglas
production function. Following Proposition 4 (ii), assume u(c) = c1 =(1   ) + bA;  2 (0; 1) ;
 = y = 0 and b0 = 0: Dene A  (1 + ) bA and Rt  1 + rt: Assume bequest constraints are
binding. Conditions for this to be the case are discussed at the end of this section.
Individuals problem From the Euler equation (7) and given the assumed utility function, it
follows that
c2t+1 = (Rt+1)
1= c1t; and (18)
Ut =
c1 1t
1   + 
c1 2t+1
1   +A =
c1 1t
1  

1 + 1=R
1= 1
t+1

+A for t > 0: (19)
Equation (18) together with the budget constraint, equation (6), can be used to solve for c1t as
c1t =
wt (1  nt)
1 + 1=R
1= 1
t+1
. (20)
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On the other hand, individual savings, st; satisfy
st = wt (1  nt)  c1t = wt (1  nt)
1 +  1=R1 1=t+1
: (21)
Regarding interior fertility choices, equation (9) can be used to rewrite (5) and (9) as
Vt = Ut + c
1 
1t
1
(nt)
wtnt
c1t
; and
c1 1t
ntwt
c1t
= (nt)(nt)
 
Ut+1
c1 1t+1
+
1
(nt+1)
wt+1nt+1
c1t+1
!
c1 1t+1;
and using (19) and (20), this expression simplies to
nt
1  nt = (nt)
(nt)
24 1
1   +
1
(nt+1)
nt+1
1  nt+1 +
A
c1 1t+1

1 + 1=R
1= 1
t+2

35 (22)


c1t+1
c1t
1  1 + 1=R1= 1t+2
1 + 1=R
1= 1
t+1
:
Firms Competitive rms produce output, y, using the technology y = zF (k; l) where k is capital
and l is labour. Let zf (k)  zF (k; 1) be production per unit of labour and assume f(k) = k:
Competition guarantees prices are equal to marginal products
Rt = zk
 1
t and wt = (1  ) zkt : (23)
Demographics Let Nt = N1t + N2t be total adult population at time t. The demographic
structure satises the following conditions
N1t = nt 1N2t; Nt = (1 + nt 1)N2t;
N1t
Nt
=
nt 1
1 + nt 1
; and
N2t
Nt
=
1
1 + nt 1
:
Aggregate resources Aggregate labour supply in the economy is Lt = N1t (1  nt) : Further-
more, aggregate capital in the economy satises Kt+1 = stN1t = stN2t+1. Therefore
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Lt+1
= st
N2t+1
N1t+1
N1t+1
Lt+1
= st
1
nt
1
1  nt+1 : (24)
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Steady state In steady state equation (22) simplies to
n
1  n
1  (n)
(n)
= (n)
"
1
u(c1)
+
 
1  (R)1= 1
1 + 1= (R)1= 1
!
 bA (c1) 1
#
: (25)
This expression is just equation (14) when  = y = 0 and R = 1, case in which the results
in Propositions 3 and 4 apply: specically, equation (25) implies a negative fertility-consumption
relationship only if A > 0 and  2 (0; 1): When R 6= 1 then parental consumption has an
additional second-order e¤ect on the relative marginal benet of having children determined by the
last term of (25). If R < 1 then this term is smaller for richer parents and therefore works toward
generating a negative fertility-income relationship reinforcing the e¤ects described in the previous
section. Furthermore, according to (18), R < 1 is also required to replicate a decreasing life-cycle
prole of consumption upon retirement as is typically the case in the data. For these two reasons
we focus the discussion that follows in the case R  1. In this case fertility is maximal for small
enough consumption levels because u(c1) goes to zero, while for large enough consumption fertility
converges to en; where en is the solution to
en
1  en 1  (en)(en) = (en)1   : (26)
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 (i) hold and R  1. Then the solution to (25) satises
en  n  N:
To fully solve for the steady state, the following two additional equations are used
1=R +  1= (R) 1= =
1  

1
n
; and (27)
c1 = (1  )

1  z
1
1 
(1  n) (R)  1 
1 + 1= (R)1= 1
: (28)
These are steady-state versions of equations (24) and (20), obtained after using equations (23) and
(21). Equation (27) describes a positive relationship between interest rates and fertility rates, say
R(n), while equation (28) shows that consumption is a positive function of total factor productivity,
z, and a negative function of both interest rates and fertility. Since (26), (27) and (28) hold for
large consumption levels, a key result that if TFP is su¢ ciently large then fertility and interest
rates are independent of TFP while consumption fully responds to TFP. This is because (26) and
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(27) can be used to solve for fertility and interest rates independently of TFP and then (28) can be
used to solve for consumption. For intermediate values of TFP, and therefore intermediate values
of consumption, higher TFP increases consumption but also reduces fertility, according to equation
(25), and interest rates, according to equation (27), which further increases consumption. These
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Comparative statics in general equilibrium. @n=@z < 0; @R=@z < 0
and @c=@z > 0 for z su¢ ciently large.
We now need to verify that binding bequest constraints and R < 1 are in fact possible
general equilibrium solutions. Rather than providing general conditions, we show some specic
examples where this is in fact the case. According to (8), bequests constraints bind if steady
state allocations and prices satisfy 1 > (n)R. Notice from equation (25) that if R  1 then
 > (n)=n = (n) because the right hand side of (25) is larger than one, under Assumption
A.1 (i). Therefore, given R  1; a su¢ cient condition for bequest constraints to bind is 1 > R
which is equivalent to the condition that children are a net benet to parents: w (1=R   ) > 0:
For example, if the cost of raising one child is less than 1=4 of parental time then the su¢ cient
condition 1 > R requires R < 4. Finally, if    then the condition 1 > R also guarantees
1 > R: Restriction    means that children are su¢ ciently costly.
Finally, notice that the positive relationship between R and n described by (27) implies that
R is highest when n = N . Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for 1  R is 1  R(N): Using (27),
R(N) is guaranteed to be below 1= if the condition in the following proposition holds.
Proposition 7. Binding bequest constraints. Su¢ cient conditions for bequest constraints
to bind are  + (=)1= < 1 
1
N and   :
Proposition 7 provides su¢ cient but not necessary conditions on parameters. Alternatively,
suppose  is chosen so that optimal fertility is equal or below the replacement rate, n  1; as is
the case in many developed economies. Suppose further that  = : Then the su¢ cient condition
in Proposition 7 becomes +1 < (1 )=: If  = 1=3; as is the typical case considered in macro,
then the condition becomes  < 1 which is always the case. These examples show that it is possible
to construct a plausible general equilibrium model where fertility decreases with TFP, bequest
constraints are binding and 1  R:
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4 Concluding comments
The analysis presented in this paper yields the following four main insights. First, explicitly consid-
ering the role of constraints to intergenerational transfers is essential in understanding the fertility-
income relationship. While with no constraints fertility and income are unrelated, binding con-
straints recover the link between income and fertility. Bequest constraints bind in the model when
the cost of raising children is below the present value of the childrens income. Available data on
the cost of raising children suggests that this is indeed the case. The theory of this paper is one
in which children are a net nancial benet. In this case, even altruistic parents would like to be
reimbursed by their own children for the cost of raising them, but this is unfeasible due to legal or
other constraints. This mechanism is at the heart of the link between income and fertility.
The second insight of the analysis is that some additional restrictions are required for the
correlation between income and fertility to be negative. Notably, the intergenerational elasticity of
substitution must be larger than one. What this implies is that high wage parents nd optimal to
increase their own consumption and reduce fertility in spite of the fact that this creates a larger gap
between their on consumption and that of a potential new born child. The idea of intergenerational
substitution is novel, and the estimation of its value becomes an important avenue for future
research.
The third insight of this paper is that in general equilibrium the fertility-income relationship
translates into a relationship between the level of total factor productivity (TFP) and fertility. Such
a link cannot be obtained in models in which unrestricted intergenerational transfers are allowed.
This link suggests that the same forces used by others researchers to explain cross-country income
di¤erences (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999, among others), namely di¤erences in TFP, can also explain
why fertility declines with income in modern times.
As a last insight, our paper provides a link between purely altruistic and some non-altruistic
models. Specically, when bequest constraints bind in purely altruistic models, the determinants
of fertility may be similar to those in which the parent cares about the number and/ or quality of
the children. The reason is that in this case fertility is determined by a comparison of marginal
benets and marginal costs of having children. Therefore, elements such as parental income and
the technology of raising children become relevant.
Our paper provides a framework of analysis in which a number of other intergenerational issues
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can be examined. OLG models with altruism, endogenous fertility and constraints to intergen-
erational transfers are not only consistent with the fertility-income relationship, but combine the
necessary elements to study policies that a¤ect redistribution across generations, as well as inter-
generational transmission of inequality. These are questions we are analyzing in on-going research.
A Appendix
A.1 Boundedness and transversality conditions
Following Theorem 4.3 in Stockey and Lucas (1989), for the principle of optimality to hold the
condition limT!1T 1t=0 (nt)V (bT+1) = 0 for all bT must be satised. A more familiar condi-
tion is obtained when fertility is constant. In this case the boundedness condition simplies to
limT!1(n)TV (bT ) = 0. When bequests constraints bind, as is the case in model, then the
boundedness condition above simplies to limT!1T 1t=0 (nt) = 0: This condition is satised due
to assumed restriction (n)  (N) < 1: For the case of unrestricted bequests and competitive
markets, in a model with endogenous population the usual no-Ponzi game condition (NPG) becomes
limT!1
BT+1
(1 + r)T
 0; (A.1)
where BT+1 are total assets of the dynasty. B can be written as BT+1 = bt+1Lt+1 where LT+1 =
Tt=0nt is family size at T + 1. At the optimum, (A.1) holds with equality. In that case, this
condition can also be written as the transversality condition for a planner as follows. Using the
intergenerational Euler Equation of the problem, one obtains
u0(c0) = (1 + r)(n0)u0(c1) = (1 + r)2 (n0)(n1)u0(c2)
= (1 + r)T u0(cT )Tt=0(nt):
Solving for (1 + r)T and substituting the result into (A.1) results in
0 = lim
T!1
bT+1LT+1
u0(cT )Tt=0(nt)
u0(c0)
= lim
T!1
bT+1
u0(cT )Tt=0nt(nt)
u0(c0)
=
1
u0(c0)
limT!1

Tt=0(nt)

bT+1u
0(cT ):
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A.2 Assumptions for existence of an interior fertility solution
Some restrictions are needed in order to guarantee a well-behaved problem. For this purpose it is
convenient to characterize the relevant functions in terms of their elasticities. We use the notation
F (x) to denote the elasticity of function F with respect to variable x.
Assumption A.1. Utility and altruism. Let c(n)  w+ y   n (w + ) : Functions  and
u satisfy: (i) (n) > u(c); (ii) 1 > (N)(1 + r); (iii) u(w + y) (w + ) < 0(0)(w + y); (iv)
u(c(N)) (w + ) > 
0(N)
1 (N)c(N); (v) and
0(n)
1 (n) strictly decreases with n for n 2 [0; N ].
Parts (i) and (ii) of Assumption A.1 are needed for the existence of an interior solution for
fertility when bequests constraints are not binding. In particular, condition (i) is needed to pre-
vent n = 0 to be the optimal solution as discussed in Becker and Barro (1988). The remaining
conditions are used to guarantee a unique interior solution for fertility when bequest constraints
are binding. Condition (iii) ensures that the marginal cost of the rst dn children is smaller than
the marginal benet; condition (iv) guarantees that marginal cost of N children is higher than its
marginal benet; and condition (v) guarantees a single crossing between marginal costs and mar-
ginal benets.25 Overall, these conditions are mild and require some minimum degree of altruism,
diminishing degree of altruism and a mild bound on the double-elasticity of utility with respect
to consumption. The last restriction is trivially satised when function u is isoelastic. Examples
of functions  satisfying condition (v) as well as the restriction 0  (n) < 1 for all n  0 are
(n) =  (1  e n) and (n) = (n)=(1 + n) for 0 <  < 1 and  > 0.26
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The steady state is characterized by equations
c =
1
1 + 
[w + y   n(w + )] ; and
c =
u(c)
1 + 
(w + )m(n);
25Some intuition for condition (v) is obtained if (n) is interpreted as the survival probability of n children. In this
case 
0(n)
1 (n) is the survival probability conditional on being "unborn," and condition (v) requires it to be diminishing.
26The function (n) = n used by Becker and Barro (1988) needs an added restriction on the maximum number
of children in order to satisfy Assumption A.1 (v).
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where m(n) = (1   (n))=0(n) is an increasing function by Assumption A.1 (v). Linearizing
these equations around the steady state yields
dc =
1
1 + 
[(1  n) dw + dy   (w + )dn] ; (A.2)
dc = c

(u)0
u
dc+

w + 
dw +
m0
m
dn

: (A.3)
Equation (A.3) can be simplied to
dc =
c
1  u

m0
m
dn+

w + 
dw

; (A.4)
where 
u
= ((u)0 c)=u: Plugging (A.4) into (A.2),
c
m0
m
dn+ c

w + 
dw =
1  u
1 + 
[(1  n) dw + dy   (w + )dn] ;
and collecting terms,

c
m0
m
+
1  u
1 + 
(w + )

| {z }
+
dn =

1  
1 + 
(1  n)  c 
w + 

| {z }
?
dw +
1  u
1 + | {z }
+
dy:
Finally, solving for dn,
dn =
1 u
1+ (1  n)  c w+
cm0m +
1 u
1+ (w + )| {z }
?
dw +
1 u
1+
cm0m +
1 u
1+ (w + )| {z }
+
dy; (A.5)
which implies that around the steady state n is increasing in y, while the e¤ect of w on n is
undetermined as stated in Proposition 1 in the text. In order to obtain @n=@w < 0 one needs
1  u
1 + 
(1  n) < c 
w + 
=
1
1 + 
[w + y   n(w + )] 
w + 
or  
1  u (1  n) w + 

+ n(w + ) < w + y:
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A su¢ cient condition for @n=@w < 0 is:
 
1  u (1  n) w + 

+N(w + ) < w + y:
Next, replacing the expression for dn in (A.5) into (A.2) and collecting terms yields
dc =
1
1 + 
266664
 
m0
m + 
m0
m +
1 u
1+
w+
c
!
| {z }
+
dw +
 
cm
0
m
cm0m +
1 u
1+ (w + )
!
| {z }
+
dy
377775 ;
which implies that around the steady state c is increasing in both y and w as stated in Proposition
1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose w ! 1: From equation (12) it follows that c ! 1 since n  N: Furthermore, notice
that
u(c) =
1
1
1  +A (c
) 1
=
1  
1 + (1  )Ac 1 > 0:
Consider rst the case  > 1: In that case, limw!1 u(c) = 0: Thus, the limit of the relative
marginal cost in equation (14) is bounded, while the relative marginal benet is innity any n  N:
As a result, maximum fertility, n = N; is optimal. For the case  < 1; limw!1 uc (c) = 1   and
equation (14) can be written as (15).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
First, write (13) as
ln(w + )   ln c   ln

1
1   (c
)1  +A

= ln0(n)  ln (1  (n)) + ln(1 + ):
Totally di¤erentiating this equation around the steady state one obtains
dw
w + 
  dc
c
  (c
)  dc
1
1  (c)
1  +A
=
"
0
dn+
0
1  dn;
31
or
dw
w + 
 	(c)dc
c
=

"
0
+
0
1  

dn;
where
	(c) =  +
(c)1 
1
1  (c
)1  +A
=  + u(c) > 0:
Since (12) implies (1 + ) dc =  (w + )dn + (1  n) dw; then the previous equation can be
written as


w + 
  	
c (1 + )
(1  n)

dw =

"
0
+
0
1     (w + )
	
c (1 + )

dn:
Next, notice from (13) that
0(n)
1  (n) =
w + 
c(1 + )
(	  ) ;
and thus
dn
dw
=
  w+ + 	c(1+) (1  n)
 "0 + w+c(1+)
:
Then the denominator is always positive and dn=dw < 0 if and only if
  
w + 
+
	
c (1 + )
(1  n) < 0;
or
1 +
y
w
> [	(c)(1  n) + n]

1 +

w

;
which corresponds to (16) in the text.
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Table 1  
Cost of raising children ages 0 to 17 - United States 
Present value in 2011 U$ 
 
Family income 
group 
Goods cost 
USDA (2012) 
Time cost Total cost 
Scenario 1: 
60% of total cost 
Scenario 2: 
75% of total cost 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Low income 148,962 223,443 446,886 372,405 595,848 
Middle income 206,709 310,063 620,127 516,772 826,836 
High income 342,759 514,138 1,028,227 856,897 1,371,036 
 
Notes:  Family income groups correspond to the categories in USDA (2012): low refers to families with before-tax income below $59,410 in 2011; 
middle between $59,410 and $102,870; and high above the latter. Goods costs correspond to the USDA (2012) projected direct parental expenses 
(housing, food, transportation, health care, clothing, child care and private education) made on a child born in 2011 from age 0 to 17, assuming an 
inflation rate of 2.55%. Costs are measured for a family with two parents and two children. Present value is computed using a discount rate of 1.5%.  
Scenario 1 corresponds to the case in which parents spend 21 hours per week in child care (Guryan et al., 2008), while under scenario 2 parents spend 
41 hours per week (Folbre, 2008). These time costs are imputed using Folbre’s (2008) estimates of the share of time costs on total costs of raising 
children on her Table 7.3 (p. 133). Hours are valued at the median wage. 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Net financial benefit of raising children ages 0 to 17 - United States 
Present value in 2011 U$ 
 
Family income 
group 
Future child’s 
income 
 
Total costs of raising child Net financial benefit 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Low income 661,529 372,405 595,848 289,124 65,681 
Middle income 1,463,970 516,772 826,836 947,198 637,134 
High income 2,281,206 856,879 1,371,036 1,424,309 910,170 
 
Notes:  Future child’s income is computed assuming the child works from age 18 to age 65. The life-cycle income of the child is computed using the 
polynomial in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) and assuming the child at age 28 has the same income as the parent at age 28, adjusted for a real 
growth rate of 1% per year. Family income when the child is born in 2011 is computed as a point within the USDA (2012) income group brackets: low 
income is $36,665; middle income is $81,140 and high income is assumed to be $126,435. Present values are computed using a discount rate of 1.5%.  
Scenarios 1 and 2 of the total cost of raising a child are extracted from Table 1. The net financial benefit of raising a child is the difference between the 
present value of the child’s future income and the present value of the total costs of raising the child. 
 
 
 
 
 
